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Abstract Future travel demand has always been difficult to estimate. Recent trends of a
slow down or stagnation in traffic growth combined with substantial demographic, eco-
nomic, and technological shifts further complicate that task. This poses a significant
planning challenge given that decision-making is often based on the benefits of infras-
tructure investments which accrue over periods as long as 60 years. In contrast to the
changing ideas around what mobility in the future will look like and the types of demand it
may need to service, the practice of forecasting future travel demand remains largely
unchanged as do the decision-making processes which flow from this. Alternative
approaches to thinking about futures such as scenario planning exist but have had more
limited deployment in the transport sector. This paper explores the institutional issues
surrounding the purpose, practice and barriers to changing the approaches of forecasting
and decision-making through an exploration of the state of practice in the UK drawing on
interviews with 23 practitioners. Drawing on Hall’s work on policy change, the research
finds that there is a strong policy paradigm built around the relationships between transport
investment and traffic growth. This has strengthened since the recession with an increased
focus on the relationship between transport and job creation. The forecasting approaches in
use today are an important part of a complex decision-making apparatus reflective of
specialized policy arenas like transport. Challenges in acknowledging, representing and
communicating uncertainty are identified leaving a growing tension between planning
visions and planning practice. We conclude by reflecting on events which may stimulate a
broader reframing of how we plan for transport futures whilst embracing key uncertainties.
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Introduction
The period from the end of the second world war to the millennium saw the establishment
and entrenchment of the automobile in every day life across many developed countries
(Urry 2008). These patterns are repeating to varying degrees across the globe today with
analysts suggesting the world vehicle fleet could grow from today’s 1 billion to 2 billion by
2030 (Sperling and Gordon 2009) with passenger vehicle kilometres growing by between
117 and 233% over the same period (ITF 2015). Growth has been attributed to rising GDP
and incomes, falling costs of ownership and increased provision of infrastructure (Dargay
et al. 2007; ITF 2015).
The task of planning for transportation has evolved as traffic growth has continued from
one which focussed largely on network supply (DoT 1989) to one which has accepted that
supply cannot expand to meet demand and where the levels of growth need to be managed
to limit congestion, air quality, safety, climate and social externalities (Buchanan 1964;
Goodwin et al. 1991, Sadik-Khan and Solomonow, 2016). Nonetheless, the fundamental
underlying logic of this period has been one where the growth in car use would come
largely from a set of broadly consistent ‘external drivers’ which would lead to growth
(ECMT 2003). The acceptance of the futility of seeking to fully accommodate this demand
changed the policy question to one around how much demand would be catered for, how
and where. The underlying pressure and logic of demand growth remained.
While there have been long-standing critiques of demand forecasting techniques (see
Boyce and Williams (2016) for a comprehensive review of both the state of art and the
critiques), recent events have highlighted more substantial divergence from previous trends
which the established approaches did not anticipate and seem ill equipped to explain. After
decades of steady increases in auto use, patterns reversed in the 2000s in many industri-
alized countries (Millard-Ball and Schipper 2010; Goodwin 2012b; Metz 2013). Aggregate
driving on UK roads peaked in 2007, declined through 2010, and only began increasing in
2014 (DfT 2016a). On a per-capita basis, declines have been evident since the late 1990s/
early 2000s (DfT 2016b: p. 12). These changes have highlighted the sensitivity of the
transport system to long-term societal shifts such as increasing labour market precarity and
delays in household formation, partnering, and parenting; as well as shorter-term move-
ments in oil prices and the macro economy (Blumenberg et al. 2016; Bastian et al. 2016;
Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment 2014; McDonald 2015; Vij et al. 2017).
Past experience tells us that a number of the factors which have traditionally defined the
sector’s understanding of future demand—such as employment, family structure, and
income—have changed. There are also a range of new considerations which are present
already, only to a small degree, but which could have profound impacts on how much and
how we travel and for what purposes. Technological innovation has begun to alter the long-
standing set of modal alternatives and attributes. Shared mobility services from car sharing
to ride-hailing to person-to-person options provide on-demand mobility thereby chal-
lenging the traditional reliance on vehicle ownership and the resulting high fixed-cost
structure of the transport market (Chase 2015). In the long-term, autonomous vehicles may
provide the means to make vehicle ownership completely unnecessary or so inexpensive
that a new type of auto domination perpetuates (Bansal and Kockelman 2017). The per-
vasive nature of mobile internet and internet enabled devices is also changing how we
shop, network and co-ordinate activities (Lyons and Davidson 2016).
The assumption—that past relationships can adequately predict the future—is
increasingly under challenge as we enter an age with unanticipated modal options,
changing cost structures, and increasing economic divides. Even where uncertainty is
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accepted, the boundaries of such uncertainty are delimited quite narrowly. Walker et al.
(2010: 918) suggest this typically encompasses ‘‘alternative, trend-based futures and/or
different parameterizations of the system model’’ where ‘‘some estimate can be made of
the probability of each of them’’. Essentially, the alternatives largely allow for variations in
the underlying drivers of demand (GDP, oil price, population) but presume the underlying
relationships remain the same. De Jong et al. (2007) also provide a useful international
critique on the limited treatment of uncertainty in modelling.
While discussion of the future of mobility has been widespread, less attention has been
paid to what this uncertain future means for the practice of transport infrastructure planning
(Zmud et al. 2013; Ecola et al. 2015; Rohr et al. 2016). Alternative prescriptions such as
dynamic and adaptive policy making (Walker et al. 2010; Marchau et al. 2010) and
scenario planning (Schofer and Stopher 1979; Lyons and Davidson 2016; Banister and
Hickman 2013) exist but they are not part of mainstream transportation planning practice.
The answer to why there has been a lack of development and/or deployment of alternative
approaches to forecasting may lie within the institutional settings of transportation plan-
ning. Here we take a broad interpretation of institutions to be the organisations, ways of
working, rules and norms within which decisions are taken.
To understand the tensions in the current decision-making system and the potential,
likelihood and process for changing how transport futures are used in planning we draw on
Peter Hall’s (1993) influential work on policy and paradigm change. Hall argues that, even
where there is scientific debate about the need to change approaches to policy making, any
change will be more political in nature depending on matters such as:
1. positional advantage within the institutional structure;
2. authority on matters of technical competence; and
3. instances of policy experimentation and policy failure.
Within his framework, Hall imbues policy arenas addressing highly technical issues as
resistant to wider societal influence to change. This, he suggests, is because they have a
body of specialised knowledge pertaining to them and there are firmly embedded operating
procedures. The transport sector appears to have such characteristics and we review some
of these further in ‘‘Background: decision-support and demand futures’’ section. Urry
(2008: p. 344) suggests that the past century saw the ‘‘naturalisation of the car and its
increasingly extensive lock-in with multiple institutions/organisations necessary for its
expansion’’. This implies that the way the system is governed has become adapted to a
norm of car growth that it is difficult to see beyond. Lyons and Davidson (2016; 104) refer
to this as ‘‘regime-compliant’’ planning. There is, of course, significant investment and
knowledge built up around the existing ways of working and therefore a variety of costs
associated with change (North 1990; Spinardi 2015). Work on transport planning in
Sweden found ‘‘slow implementation of new notions, methods and scientific knowledge
when practice is building mostly on experienced knowledge. It also opens up for
unforeseen power relations and reinforces structures which do not necessarily promote
change’’ (Antonson and A˚kerskog 2015, p56).
Equally critical to a debate about changes to approaches to planning for transportation
must be the visibility of a need to change. Here, Hall suggests that policy paradigms can be
threatened by anomalies (as was the case in the economic policies of his initial case study).
Here, the gap between observed transport trends and those that have been forecast pre-
viously would be the anomaly. He suggests that in response ‘‘ad-hoc attempts are generally
made to stretch the terms of the paradigm to cover them, but this gradually undermines the
intellectual coherence and precision of the existing paradigm’’ (p280) and this may, in-
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turn, lead to some experiments in policy adaptation. However, ‘‘if the paradigm is gen-
uinely incapable of dealing with analogous developments, these experiments will result in
policy failures that gradually undermine the authority of the paradigm and its advocates
even further.’’ (p280) It is argued in this paper that the debates surrounding ‘peak car’ and
more uncertain transport futures reflect an on-going debate on paradigm coherence and that
this forms an essential component of any institutional process of change to the practice of
forecasting and planning for transport.
This article explores the extent to which different institutional factors constrain or
facilitate the development of new ways of looking at the practice of national and regional
long-range travel demand forecasting. The paper uses a case study of the United Kingdom
where there exists a centralised and well documented set of tools and procedures through
which strategic decision-making is conducted. It has also been the site of significant debate
around changing mobility patterns and their implications for forecasting practice. Our
research assesses three related research questions:
1. What is the purpose of forecasting and how have long-range forecasting tools and
practices been adapted in response to uncertainty about future mobility patterns?
2. What are the institutional barriers to consideration of uncertainty in transportation
infrastructure planning
3. What does the UK experience suggest for the ability for transport planning to adapt
practices and techniques to address uncertainty in future travel behaviour?
The article introduces the review and interview method adopted for the study before
setting out the approaches to decision-making and forecasting deployed in the UK. The
interviews are used to reflect on each of the research questions in turn with the findings
interpreted through reflection on the literature on institutional change which allows for the
broader implications of the work to be considered. The paper concludes with a reflection
on the potential for transport planning practices to adapt to more uncertain futures.
Research approach
To answer the research questions, we focus on the United Kingdom, particularly England,
because the debates about paradigm coherence in the transport sector there have been
prominent and transparent. Information on practice is gathered from published information
and interviews with practitioners at regional and national levels. Conversations about UK
forecasting practices have been well-captured in academic journals, websites, transport
newsletters, and governmental reports from the Department for Transport, Transport
Scotland, the Welsh Government Transport Ministry, as well as local and regional
authorities. Interviews were conducted with current and former governmental staff and
consultants involved with demand forecasting and strategic evaluation of transport
schemes. Interviews with 23 individuals, 14 of whom gave consent to be quoted, were
conducted in May and June 2016. Interview protocols were approved by the institutional
review boards of the University of Leeds and the University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill.
At the time of initiating a nationwide set of road traffic forecasts, the Department for
Transport (DfT) had responsibility for transport across the whole of the UK. Since
devolution in 1998, Scotland and Wales have assumed many (although slightly different)
powers for transport. The DfT therefore only has jurisdiction over English roads. Where
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this matters for forecasting practice or policy context we identify this although for many of
the wider societal trends and technological changes, the underlying issues remain common.
In such cases, we refer to the UK. Whilst each country will have its own structures and
modelling approaches, the themes which we identify are not specific to the UK case study.
Background: decision-support and demand futures
All planning decisions require some form of prospective assessment of the future, whether
this is what is perceived to be likely or desirable. The creation of demand futures, by
whatever method, is therefore a part of the policy process and how it is done will be a
function of the types of questions the process was aiming to answer. In exploring the
institutional issues surrounding demand forecasting today it is necessary, therefore, to
understand the institutional pathway through which the present day procedures emerged.
Since the 1960s the UK has operated some form of economic assessment of major
transport schemes. The system has been highly centralised with allocations made by the UK
government for motorways and the rail system as well as setting the rules and approvals
process for local projects. Mackie and Worsley (2013) review the development of the
appraisal process over time. They note that the scope of appraisal has widened and adapted to
new policy priorities. In particular there is inclusion of a range of environmental factors,
safety and more recently wider economic benefits such as agglomeration and job creation.
Where possible, theUK seeks tomonetise impacts but allows for assessments of overall value
for money to be adjusted by consideration of the wider factors such as lost environmental
amenity. All decisionswere taken by theUKgovernment on the basis of a relative assessment
of the value for money of different investments. Benefit–cost ratios remain dominant in what
is seen to be good value for money (for England see DfT 2015a)1 although a review of road
projects in the late 1990s showed that, despite the importance of travel time savings to
investment decisions, qualitative environmental factors did influence decisions (Nellthorp
and Mackie 2000). Whilst some of the details of the approaches to assessing the benefits and
costs of projects are different, the UK shares many similarities with other countries such as
Sweden, the Netherlands, Germany, the US, New Zealand and Australia in the development
of ex-ante scheme appraisal (Mackie and Worsley 2013; Quinet 2013; Romijn and Renes
2013). There appears though to be a stronger cross-project and cross-national comparative
tradition resulting from the centralised approach to governance, particularly in England. All
major strategies should have a Sustainability Assessment conducted and all projects have an
Environmental Impact Assessment in line with European legislation. A full account of the
evolution of transport and land-use planning can be found in Headicar (2009) if required.
In the UK major projects should be demonstrably consistent with national policy and
there is, in turn, a need for local policy to be consistent with national policy. Here then it is
important to recognise that forecasts are not separate from policy, nor solely an input to
them, but intrinsically interwoven. As well as the forecasts being determined by the
technical capabilities and know how of the time, they will also have been influenced by the
political mood of the time which might steer, for example, what comprises ‘low’, ‘high’
and therefore ‘central’ forecasts. In 1989 for example, the forecasts came out alongside the
1 The Department for Transport classifies projects in the following bands of Value for Money: Poor
(0.0–1.0), Low (1.0–1.5), Medium (1.5–2.0), High (2.0–4.0), Very High (4.0?) with only those scoring High
or Very High seen to be strong candidates for investment. Value for Money is the Benefit:Cost Ratio
adjusted by judgment for significant non quantifiable benefits or impacts.
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major road building programme announced by ‘Roads for Prosperity’ (DoT 1989). In 1997,
an approach to managing rather than accommodating demand was adopted with a change
in government (DETR 1998) reflected in a different approach to the application of the
NTM (DETR 2000). Most recently (2009 and 2015) the forecasts have occurred on the
back of the global financial downturn with the 2015 forecasts being produced with enough
of a time lag to incorporate some of the understanding of the short-run effects of the
downturn. There is an increased emphasis on infrastructure investment to stimulate growth
and a strong positive association in policy between traffic growth and economic prosperity.
The Treasury (rather than the DfT) has identified infrastructure investment as a major part
of the economic stimulus package noting that ‘‘Infrastructure networks form the backbone
of a modern economy and are a major determinant of growth and productivity… To remain
globally competitive, the UK needs to address these failures [fragmentation and under-
investment] and develop an infrastructure capable of supporting a dynamic, modern
economy’’ (HM Treasury 2011: 5, brackets added).
The DfT maintains several models to predict travel demand by mode for use in evaluation
of national-level policy initiatives and strategic assessment of modal funding allocations.
Traditionally, the forecasts and the demand implied from these models have been used as
inputs to the business case for all major projects (those over £10 m in value). Whilst each
individual investment will be assessed through a more detailed bespoke model these tools and
the national guidance on appraisal are an important guide for all decisions and for considering
initial allocations across modes and areas. At a regional and local scale, the major cities in
England are being given increased autonomy in determining how to spend capital allocations
for major projects. However, the authorities are still required to make the case to national
government for their funding settlements and so the extent to which previous national
approaches to funding allocation remain important is an empirical question we explore.
UK national road traffic forecasts and practice
In this section, we present some of the key debates that have surrounded the National
Transport Model for England and the production of forecasts of road traffic growth. The
section begins by highlighting the identification of the anomaly between forecast and
actual demand and the explanations for that. It provides brief descriptions of the National
Transport Model and the adaptations that have been made in response to the critiques
raised. The authors do not seek to take a position here of the elegance of the model nor the
responses taken but to provide sufficient context for an international audience to under-
stand this part of the institutional process of planning practice and the subsequent prac-
titioner debate. We extensively reference the reports published to date and note that this is
a debate which has a high degree of transparency.
Discrepancies between forecast and actual road traffic have been the anomaly moti-
vating conversation about planning for long-range transport infrastructure. In 2012, Phil
Goodwin, Professor of Transport Policy, showed forecast road travel was consistently
higher than actual. For example, road traffic in 2005, prior to the global financial crisis, was
less than the high and low forecasts from 1989 to 1997 (Fig. 1) (Goodwin 2012a). Pre-
sentation of the differences has been coupled with calls to review the National Transport
Model (Buchan 2012; Metz 2014).
Road traffic forecasts (RTF) for the UK come from the National Transport Model
(NTM), a four-step travel demand model augmented with sub-models for freight (Fig. 2).
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The NTM combines exogenous forecasts of future population and employment with
models of travel behaviour to produce estimates of vehicle ownership, trips, trip distances
and mode for each of 8 trip purposes across thousands of spatial zones (for brief
description of model structure and approach see DfT 2015b; for in-depth description see
DfT 2011). The translation of population and employment into trips is based on beha-
vioural models calibrated from UK National Travel Survey data. Whilst the model pro-
duces multi-modal estimates of travel demand, DfT cautions against the reliability of non-
road forecasts (DfT 2015b: 30). Beyond road traffic forecasts, the NTM, specifically the
National Trip End Model (NTEM), plays a role in local and regional transport planning.
The Department provides regions with tools to develop scenarios that adjust future
employment and population growth whilst adhering to control totals on study area trip
making developed from the NTEM (DfT 2017a). A single core scenario is used for all
projects which is consistent with NTEM and high and low growth variants are tested
consistent with national guidance.2 There remains, therefore, significant national oversight
and influence on local and regional processes.
Fig. 1 Forecast and actual road traffic. Source reproduced with permission from Phil Goodwin
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Fig. 2 Summary of national transport model structure. Note Adapted from DfT 2015b, p. 32
2 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/webtag-tag-unit-m4-forecasting-and-uncertainty-November-2014.
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The dialogue on the causes and implications of observed differences in road travel can
be viewed as an extended conversation on the paradigm coherence of methods for allo-
cating transport infrastructure resources. For example, some explanations for differences
between forecast and observed demand do not challenge the current transport planning
paradigm. London road conditions in the NTM did not reflect capacity reductions due to
bus and bike lane improvements; the most recent 2015 forecasts include more accurate
road capacity assumptions (DfT 2015b, p. 15). Macroeconomic shocks associated with the
GFC also caused difficulties to predict travel decreases due to declines in industrial output
and employment.
Other explanations for the gap between forecast and actual road traffic challenge current
assumptions about connections between economic and traffic growth and underlie debates
about how behavioural assumptions should influence policy decisions. NTS data have
shown sustained decreases in trip making and a declining connection between income and
auto ownership over the past 20 years (DfT 2015c). DfT has recently updated the trip
generation and auto ownership models with new rates reflective of recent (2011) beha-
viour; the impact has been a decrease of 19–24% in the volume of trips predicted annually
in the UK from 2011 to 2041 compared to the previous model (DfT 2017a, p. 59).
Observing the structure and stated purpose of the model raises some issues which we
return to through the interviews. First, there remains a clear distinction at a national level
between forecasting for road, rail and local transport. Second, the national transport model
is intended to provide some form of consistency of approach to understanding demand at a
regional and local level. These are historical institutional features rather than necessarily
being technically optimal. Finally, the model structure is based on the assumption of a set
of relationships between income, driving license holding and car ownership which have
been well understood as car ownership boomed but which we highlighted in ‘‘Introduc-
tion’’ section may now in a period of significant flux.
Analysis
The analysis follows three themes which emerge from the interviews, organised to help
answer the research questions set out in ‘‘Introduction’’ section.
Consideration of uncertainty and changing behaviour
The public dialogue about the accuracy of the DfT’s national road traffic forecasts created
a pressure to re-evaluate the underlying assumptions to ensure the continued credibility of
modelled results. Such challenges could be quite problematic for a government because the
forecasts and associated trip models underlie funding allocations and business cases for all
projects.
DfT has traditionally considered uncertainty around macroeconomic conditions by
producing three sets of road traffic forecasts: core (or central), low growth (high gas prices/
low GDP), and high growth (low petrol prices/high GDP). To assess the impacts of
behavioural change, the 2015 RTF introduces two additional scenarios. The first uses new
(lower) trip generation rates calibrated to more recent NTS data (p. 35). The next models
road traffic assuming there is no relationship between income and car travel. Resulting
forecasts predict sharply different growth trajectories. For example, using lower trip rates
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decreases estimates of traffic in 2040 by approximately 65 billion miles or 18% from the
central forecast (DfT 2015b, p. 41).
The overall fan of traffic levels between the lowest and highest forecast is now some
100 billion vehicle kilometres per year by 2040, or 44% of the 2010 levels from which the
growth was estimated. Although this approach only deals with a small part of the potential
set of uncertainties (Walker et al.’s (2010) definition of Level 2 uncertainty) it is still quite
substantial in its potential implications for policy. How might decision-makers respond to
such uncertainty?
Interviewees gave inconsistent reports of the appetite of elected officials for information
on the uncertainty of future forecasts. A minority of interviewees felt elected officials and
agency leaders wanted to understand the full range of possible outcomes in order to select
the best funding strategies. These were often planners working at the national level. At the
regional level, opinions were more split. Some felt there was strong interest: ‘‘politicians
have generally embraced that [uncertainty] a lot, really with open arms, because politicians
almost by definition are suspicious of black box solutions.’’ Others were more sceptical
about the interest in multiple scenarios or forecasts, partly because of the difficulties in
presenting what that actually means:
I mean, I’m sure any [title redacted, elected official] will say is, ‘‘I don’t want 53
forecasts, give me a central forecast’’
‘‘Oh yeah, 21,472 vehicles a day…’’ whereas in fact it could be anything from 12 up
to 50 but if you presented that information to the public or to politicians it would lose
its credibility wouldn’t it? ‘‘How can you have a forecast between 12,000 and
50,000?’’ they’d say.
The updates of the NTM show the Department’s concern with and responsiveness to
critiques of the model. Addressing the critiques is critical to maintaining credibility of the
transportation planning process, but also introduces potential discontinuities with previous
assumed demand. However, whilst that potential exists, there has been no shift in approach
to the treatment of future demand dealing with this much wider fan of uncertainty. The
approach adopted is consistent with Hall’s suggestion of development within the existing
paradigm.
Representatives from most regional and local agencies reported awareness of internal
discussions about technological, demographic, and behavioural changes that might lead to
shifting travel demand patterns. As several regional planners stated:
It [changing travel patterns]’s something that we do debate. Certainly looking at the
data we’ve got, there does seem to be a suggestion that the trips-per-capita by car
overall fits in with this ‘‘peak car’’ theory, if you like.
We’re currently developing our 2040 transport strategy and that strategy is mainly
central about the innovation and technology and how transport planning can con-
sider…and how much impact that would have on our policies and our strategies. So
that’s very much central to the discussion at this moment happening in [redacted] and
politicians are very keen for us to understand and bring that kind of activity into our
planning.
However, acknowledgement of the potential import of these issues was also not coupled
with changes in processes. Planners expressed concerns that the trends were difficult to
incorporate into current planning tools for scheme appraisal because the causes are not well
understood. For example:
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We have to … consider the policy implications [of changing mobility]. And then to
what extent do we reflect that in our modelling?…We’re not prepared for that in our
forecasting.
There are things that get murmured around like automated cars and deliveries, home
deliveries, how is that going to impact; but I don’t believe we’ve got anywhere near
the answers. It’s hard enough predicting normal stuff let alone how home deliveries
are going to affect your shopping patterns.
I mean you might look at things like household size, household compositions; those
are tractable things that people have been doing for decades. But real change, either
structural economic change or socioeconomic change, attitudes, preferences, beha-
viour, those are things that are just difficult to deal with in long-term forecasting
processes.
we need to put our own scenario together and we don’t necessarily want to under-
stand or we haven’t got the time to unpick different car ownership or behavioural
patterns, … so we jump straight to.
Whilst there was little attention on how forecasting practices at the regional level might
accommodate different emerging mobility futures, there was a focus on the operational
uncertainty caused by current manifestations of changing mobility patterns and modal
options. For example, a regional agency identified tracking and understanding changing
bus usage patterns, particularly among the elderly, as an important component of their
work. This was because seniors are eligible for concessionary fares—the costs of which
must be covered by local and regional authorities—and the budgetary impacts could be
substantial. Similarly another agency noted a desire to better understand use of ride-hailing
services such as Uber because of the possibilities of needing to oversee the service in the
future. As the planner summarized:
we do spend quite a lot of time analysing and trying to understand them [ride-hailing
services], but not necessarily then trying to forecast and predict.
This could be seen to be early evidence of the divergence between recent trends and the
potentially disruptive impacts of new technologies in the present day which is not yet a
feature of future planning despite being prominent in long-term industrial and technology
strategies.
Contemporary policy focus
It seems therefore that greater uncertainty in future demand is accepted but not incorpo-
rated. It is not that these changes do not matter to transport planners, they just do not matter
enough now to address any shortcomings which the existing approaches might have. An
uncertainty about how to address these new trends is one reason posited above. However,
as we explore in this section, progress is being made on addressing uncertainties, just
different ones and ones which are more politically salient. In particular here, the changing
economic narrative since the global financial crisis on the purpose of infrastructure
investment and its role in creating, sustaining or ‘unlocking’ jobs. As aptly put by a
planner:
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so it was all about the economy, economy, economy, economy. Did I say it was
about the economy? It was about the economy. And before you think about anything
else it’s about the economy.
One of the challenges of imagining different demand futures in the current environment
is that the construction of new infrastructure is seen as an essential part of future pro-
ductivity growth. Futures therefore which have more limited demand growth or even, as
Lyons and Davidson (2016) posit for New Zealand, reductions in travel are inconsistent
with the embodied belief system of what transport investments are for and the relationship
between growth in transport and growth in the economy (see also ‘‘Background: decision-
support and demand futures’’ section).
Recent devolution in decision-making authority from central government to local and
regional authorities has given sub-national entities the role of identifying and prioritizing
investments. These changes have been spurred by efforts to promote economic develop-
ment and in some cases are explicitly linked to the goal of growing the economy. The
conditions set for devolving funding have focused local transport planning agencies on
evaluating not just the transport benefits of proposed schemes (generally travel time sav-
ings) but wider impacts around employment. Standard tools and processes have not been
previously been in place to guide the definition and measurement of measures of economic
benefit such as gross value added. This has led to innovation, as regions have developed
business cases that focus on job creation and economic development impacts, as well as the
traditional metrics around travel time savings and the related benefit–cost ratio. This switch
has required agencies to continue doing traditional cost–benefit analyses as prescribed by
DfT in order to ensure value for money, but it has also necessitated that many of them
develop a set of strategic models (often transportation-land use interaction models) that are
used to estimate employment and wider economic benefits that are integrated into a
broader strategic case. Several interviewees detailed how devolution has affected their use
of tools, planning processes, and sources of funding:
In the context of devolution and certainly for combined authorities, transport has
been elevated into wider economic strategies so now there are these strategic eco-
nomic plans which tell a much broader story, and in a way sort of local bodies saying
what they think the future is going to look like.
as devolution develops you have lots of different masters and possible sources of
funding so it’s no longer me and the Department for Transport. It’s lots of people it
was very much a case of let’s look at the full benefits of any schemes that are going
on rather than just the narrow central government defined view of things.
Transportation agencies can be seen to act as budget maximising entities (Niskanen
1968) with a desire to extract funding from national and regional/local competitions. This
tradition is particularly strong in the UK given the strong control over local public
spending exerted by central government. The current framing around which funding is
allocated has largely been driven by an overarching economic narrative and the need to
demonstrate agglomeration benefits, job creation potential and the relationship between
investments and uplift in economic Gross Value Added (DfT 2014). The effort required to
develop these processes, craft an economic business case for proposed schemes, and
complete standard DfT-compliant analyses of BCR is large. Most regions did not then have
additional time or staff available to consider the impacts of long-term changes in transport
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demand or uncertainty in these forecasts. Nor is such uncertainty a feature in the current
funding ‘rules of the game’ as the local stakeholder below set out:
so if I’m a local authority and I’m trying to get some money from government or
even tell an internal story to my politicians to get some money for transport it’s great
if I can take the Department for Transport’s road traffic forecast. I say ‘‘Well, in
30 years’ time [redacted] will have ground to a halt because I’ve got these road
traffic forecasts; I won’t question them now. They tell me this is just shooting up so I
need more transport investment.’’ So that’s quite a handy thing; it’s handy not to
have to question that.
This approach is consistent with Lyons and Davidson’s (2010; 110) assessment of a
‘‘practical’’ worldview where the outlook for the future ‘‘aligns best with immediate
interests and imperatives’’.
Institutional arrangements
Current tools and processes reflect the global intellectual history of the field and the
particularities of UK transport planning as set out in ‘‘Background: decision-support and
demand futures’’ section. DfT, as the primary funder of transport infrastructure, developed
a set of practices and protocols that allowed efficient allocation of funds. A standard set of
national models and approaches was critical so that decisions were not influenced by
overly optimistic assumptions by certain regions.
the Department of Transport’s job, it had a pot of money that was fixed, and it was
capital rationing, and therefore there might be some uncertainty with that forecast,
but … it’s a relative exercise.
What the government want is to be able to compare every project on an equal footing
and then allocate that in the hope that this is the most efficient allocation possible,
and so the most important thing is to have equal standards for everybody and an
agreed common view of the world of the future. So that’s where this has come from.
Yet these processes and tools that allow for fair comparison can make consideration of
uncertainty difficult. First, behavioural relationships are captured in hundreds of model
parameters that represent the relationship between socio-economic characteristics and
travel. This creates issues around which parameters should be changed and how they
should be changed. DfT’s recent efforts for the 2015 RTF show how these parameters can
be adjusted to assess particular scenarios. However, the approach was never really
developed for good cross-modal planning nor for more detailed local or regional planning
and issues regarding divergence remains.
What we see is the critical role that central government guidance plays in the definition
of and consideration of uncertainty in UK transport planning. Many regions won’t consider
changing practice until the tools are available from DfT. This reinforces one of the findings
from studies of multi-level governance in the UK transport sector (Marsden et al. 2014)
which suggested very limited incentive for lower tiers of government to be divergent from
higher tiers due to their resource dependency. However, this seems to go beyond just
resources but reflects a strong ‘institutionalization of ideas’ across the sector. Radaelli
(1995; 178) suggests that ‘‘institutions give stability to shared causal beliefs, they set up
structures of meaning, they create networks of actors, they constrain the perception of
interests and socio-economic change’’. Here it seems difficult for regional actors to have
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future demand forecasts that are not based on the same premise as those of national
government. As we note above whilst it would be difficult for them to do so, there also
appears little incentive to depart from future assumptions which support infrastructure
investment ambitions.
The historical reasons for the current approach to forecasting (central funding alloca-
tion) seem to be constraining, to some extent, the future directions that can be considered.
For example, visions of future transport that have high levels of mobility as a service and
autonomous transportation will need to be capable of re-imagining how we travel, when
and for what purposes. However, the demand futures which road and regional transport
planners are working to are all premised around relationships based on, for example, a car
ownership model (Fig. 2).
The strong siloed modal traditions within transport also seem set to play a role. Rail
futures are equally anchored in their own modal history and policy sub-system with little
interest being expressed in understanding what these future changes might mean for rail
markets. Contrasting the amount of effort spent on updating road versus rail tools one rail
observer noted ‘‘I don’t think the rail sector is very good at predicting and responding to
changes in travel behaviours. I think actually the rail sector is incredibly parochial, and
they just assume it will be okay’’. This echoes Low and Astle’s (2009) finding that road
forecasting tends to have a more developed science base than that for public transport. A
second interviewee noted ‘‘the long distance market is in danger of getting absolutely
stuffed because autonomous cars and the price of the electric travel [lower marginal
mileage costs by car] could significantly reduce the cost of traveling by road compared to
rail’’ (brackets added). Comparatively little as been done to address the on-going dis-
tinction between road and rail network forecasting.
The current system displays many characteristics of a socio-technical system in some
form of lock-in with a large and invested set of skills which imbues confidence in the
existing set of practices (Kay 2006; Antonson and A˚kerskog 2015 and Spinardi 2015).
Discussion
Reflecting back on Hall’s understanding of processes of policy change we can see two
countervailing forces in the debate around transport futures. The first is the challenge to
existing processes based around the increasingly accepted anomalies between current
trends and past modelled performance. We acknowledge the continued efforts of the DfT
to ensure that their model is well calibrated to contemporary data and to respond to
challenges raised. The anomaly arguments have not yet however been sufficiently large to
have undermined the technical tools deployed across the sector. We suggest though that
recent updates to underlying trips rates, which removed nearly a quarter of expected trips,
go well beyond previously accepted policy wisdom about what levels of behavioural
adaptation travellers could achieve (e.g. CCC 2016). These effects are yet to ripple through
the planning process and this debate will grow. Coupled with this is evidence that local
transport bodies are already seeking to understand the impacts of new forms of mobility on
their networks and on their role as transport agencies yet these are not part of a set of
assumptions which define future demand. ‘Business as Usual’ or ‘do-minimum’ ignores
elements of the mobility system which are here today and which, elsewhere, form part of
government imaginings of transport futures. For example, whilst the government has an
aspiration that all vehicles will be electric vehicles by 2050 there are no assumptions about
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how this might shape demand in the forecasts. The same goes for mobility as a service and
increased automation. This is a further anomaly.
The second force though is the wider political agenda which is reinforcing current
practice and pushing its extension into ever more complex questions around job creation
and agglomeration benefits. This could demonstrate confirmation bias where the strategy
and investment narrative is around investment in infrastructure and so future demand
growth forecasts face limited challenge. There is a very strong political and institutional
axis which supports the continuation of an adapted business as usual approach.
Whether this tension needs to be resolved will depend on the readers’ own position on
the strength of the anomaly arguments and the capability of the existing paradigm to
continue to provide sufficiently robust answers given the greater range of accepted
uncertainty identified. Derbyshire (2016; 48) neatly sums up the dilemma facing trans-
portation planning ‘‘Overly-focusing on how past developments have led to the present
renders it difficult to think about how the future may develop in unexpected ways.
However, conversely, focusing too much on the latter (potentially unexpected develop-
ments) results in our considerations of the future appearing disconnected from the present
and past from which it emerges’’. We suggest some ways in which the challenge and
debate will unfold.
First, the fundamental distinctions between forecasting on the basis of past projections
and more vision or scenario based approaches to planning are not addressed through
incremental development of existing tools. As Watson (2012) points out, the changes to
how and why we move around will be an on-going process and so we will always see
traces of travel which are diminishing as well as new ways of doing things which are
growing. Whilst we are at the foothills of larger changes, new ways of doing things which
may better reflect future demand will inevitably be small in our data sets. Recalibration of
existing tools brings no guarantee of adequately capturing the impact such changes will
have in the longer run as it can only capture what impact they have had to date. Such an
approach would also fail to capture more substantial changes if changes reach a critical
mass or ‘tipping point’ as suggested by Urry (2004). The scale of changes identified in
recalibrations and their cumulative impact over time gives an indication of the importance
of the anomalies.
We have not, through this study, developed a preferred solution or clear optimal way of
understanding demand in the future although we have highlighted several options devel-
oped elsewhere (Walker et al. 2010; Marchau et al. 2010; Banister and Hickman 2013;
Lyons and Davidson 2016;). We suggest that a bigger and more immediate challenge to
changing practice is a fundamental reframing of the transportation debate. Since the global
financial crisis transportation investment has been reinforced as a central pillar of growth
stimulation and a symbol of efficiency and modernity. The narrative is that good transport
stimulates jobs and therefore more mobility, therefore more mobility is hard to challenge
(‘or don’t you want those jobs?’). There is currently little or no space to reframe the debate
about the changing relationship between the economy and travel, little incentive to do so
(as that is where what limited public spending is available to promote) nor the technical
capacity to do so (given the focus on developing new methods for justifying investments in
terms of gross value added and jobs). Despite the acceptance that ‘predict and provide’
does not work, the assumed relationships between transport and the economy which
dominate policy thinking today are not dissimilar from those which were in place as
automobility took off and so we seem unable to shake ourselves from Lyons and David-
son’s categorisation of a regime compliant pathway. To challenge this requires identifying
strong evidence of which sites and contexts do not illustrate these traditional relationships
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and to understand the different role that transport plays in creating these attractive and
highly productive cities and areas. This reframing could unlock different needs from the
supporting analytical system.
Linked to this is the potential for greater polycentric governance (Ostrom 2010) with the
devolution of transportation powers and budgets to regional and local transport planning
bodies in England which may yet provide opportunities to think differently. London for
example suggests that it has a different set of demand trends unfolding to the rest of the UK
(TfL 2014). Also, places where innovations are being more strongly promoted and adopted
could result in a bottom up identification for a different set of future investment needs and
therefore a different approach to thinking about the future. However, for the reasons set out
above, this seems some way off in England right now as the need for consistency with
central government processes remains strong.
It is also possible, although probably over a longer time period and likely less desirable,
that the anomaly debate will become more definitive in nature. There are statutory pro-
cedures such as planning appeals which could be used by groups objecting to infrastructure
schemes to cast doubt on the demand forecasts currently deployed. Indeed, even under the
existing paradigm planning inspectors have identified risks from ‘‘structural changes in the
demand for transport’’ (Whitehead 2015: 337) as a contributory factor to declining a major
public transport scheme in the northern city of Leeds. If the anticipated trends in shared
smart mobility and automation continue to develop then the current forecasting approach
and model structure may struggle to withstand these different forms of scrutiny.
Greater thought also, therefore, needs to be given to the timing of any change in
approach. At any point in time there is several billion pounds worth of infrastructure
investment both under active construction and development in the pipeline. The practical
implications of radically changing demand assumptions and the risks of legal challenges to
such schemes seem non-trivial (even where the case for investment might remain sound).
This is where greater thought about tools which allow for divergent pathways in their
assessment may be helpful as some schemes can be justified under a number of futures
(e.g. Foxon et al. 2013).
This paper set out to explore the challenges in current practices of planning for trans-
portation. Whilst at the heart of the debate is an inevitable on-going technical and scientific
puzzling over whether we are doing the right thing and whether our tools are adequate for
the job, the research has uncovered the wider importance of the institutional context and
the political narratives at play that shape the evidence that is needed and the histories and
focus of the dominant technical practices. Although many of the technical challenges
raised here will matter in a range of places, the institutional structures and traditions will be
distinct and so we might anticipate different responses over time in different places.
Perhaps it will be through experimentation and learning that the potential for a transition in
the practice of transportation planning will be seen to be feasible. It may be a necessary
transition to accompany that foreseen for the future of mobility.
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